Ladnmine problem in Uzbekistan.
OBSERVER OF 2005
Introduction. Uzbekistan is a country that holds mine resources and widely employs them for own defense. A section of the Uzbek-Afghan border (90 to 220 km long, according to different data sources) was mined in later 1980s – early 1990s after the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan. Partially, the border was additionally fortified with antipersonnel mines in 1998, when the Taliban commenced on active military operations in the northern provinces of Afghanistan. A potential danger that armed groups of the radical movement “Taliban” would break through was the main reason behind the use of nonselective ammunition. The second reason was to stop drug trafficking and smuggling of ammunition.
In 1999, the government of Uzbekistan commissioned the Ministry of Defense and the Committee for State Frontier Protection (CSFP) to start mining the border with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as there was a threat of break-through by Islamic terrorist groups. In the summer of 1999 and 2000 there were combats with representatives of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), who penetrated into the country from neighboring states and thus forced the Uzbek government to have mined the border.
The minefields occupy up to 70 percent of the Uzbek-Tajik frontier. Mines were also placed around Uzbek enclaves Soh and Shakhimardan in the southern province of Batken (Kyrgyzstan) and other sections of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border in the Fergana valley( ).
It is known that the residents of villages adjacent to the mined section of the Uzbek-Tajik border had intention to place pickets protesting against the death of their fellow countrymen who were blown up on Uzbek mines near the airport of Dushanbe when Islam Karimov, the President of Uzbekistan, arrived there to attend a regional summit of the Central Asia Cooperation Organization in October, 2004. However, the Tajik authorities managed to prevent it( ).
As Uzbek-Turkmen relations worsened in 2003, Tashkent was planning to fortify the frontier with antipersonnel and antitank mines apprehending the penetration of armed groups from the Karakum desert ( ). The source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that preparation for mining began in that period. The source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers, that the mining of the certain territory during this period passed, however it has no the data on quantity(amount) of the used mines and the sizes of the mined area.
BAN POLICY
Convention for antipersonnel mines (APM) prohibition. Uzbekistan has never joined the Ottawa Convention for antipersonnel mines prohibition. Though this issue was under consideration, the 1999 and 2000 terrorist attacks and terrorist acts in the capital of the country had become an obstacle in the way of the process. Today, Uzbekistan is not willing to sign this international document.
In this respect, Article 7 (Transparency measures) is unfeasible. Since no relevant information is accessible, researchers of Landmine Monitor failed to obtain data concerning the quantity of APM available in the country. The number of destroyed mines is still unknown. The armed forces of the country are known to be armed with the following types of mines: OZM-72, POMZ and explosive PMN. The source in the Ministry of Defence has noted, that armed forces of Uzbekistan possess all types of mines which were made in Soviet Union( ).
Legislation. A regulatory framework that regulates the use of ammunition, defense technology, their storage, procurement, sale and transportation has been established in Uzbekistan. Thus, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan issued the Resolution “On state regulation and control over the transit of special goods and military contingents through the Republic of Uzbekistan” # 62 dated February 21, 2002. This Resolution states that ammunition such as bombs, missiles, mines, grenades, shells, cartridges, and other similar means of conducting military operations are referred to as special goods eligible for transit through the territory of the country under special permissions (Article 7).
Resolution by the Ministry of Justice “A list of ammunition, defense technology and impedimenta, eligible for transit through the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan under special permissions” # 1167, dated August 26, 2002 approves the Annex of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations (ЭГ-01/103409) and the State Custom Committee (# 02/20-31, dated August 19, 2002), which specifies the list of ammunition, and Article 7 therein includes, among the others, mines.
The abovementioned documents were adopted after the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, dated February 20, 2002 that revoked the list of goods not eligible for transit through the territory of the Republic of Uzbekistan (the list contained items of ammunition, including mines).
Resolution by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan # 4, dated January 7, 2004 “About measures on further improvement of custom tariff regulations” specifies a commodity group that includes arms and ammunition (by the Code of commodity nomenclature for foreign economic activity – 9303, 9304, 9306).
Annex # 1 to “Instructions on the order of importing and exporting goods (products) from the Republic of Uzbekistan, which are subject to mandatory certification,” states that ammunition is subject to mandatory certification ( ).
Participation in the APM prohibition movement. On November 22, 2000 official Tashkent abstained from voting the UN General Assembly Resolution 57/74 on mines prohibition. Though the representatives of the Embassy of Uzbekistan to Moscow attended a regional conference that was held on November 22, 2000, they did not give any comments. The government of Uzbekistan did not assign its delegation to the Global Summit for antipersonnel mines prohibition that was held in Nairobi, Kenia, November 27 through December 3, 2004. Also, no representatives of the government were assigned to the 1st Central Asia Meeting for mine prohibition that was held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and the Regional Meeting held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in April 2004.
During a special session of the Standing Council of the OSCE that was held in Vienna on June 18 the government of Uzbekistan stated it would readily consider the issue of mine clearing on the state frontier.
On August 18, 2003 the representative of the OSCE in Uzbekistan, Mr. Ahmet Erozan, informed that the organization would persuade Tashkent to sign the Ottawa Convention and was going to develop a special program for this purpose, the participation in which would gradually bring Uzbek authorities to denial from mining their territory.
A workshop that the OSCE and government bodies of Uzbekistan planned to carry out in Tashkent, October 1-2, 2004, was not held as the Uzbek part denied to attend it ( ). Official powers provide the people of Uzbekistan with no information about the very existence of mine problem. The subject is forbidden for circulation in mass media. General public has no information about civilians blown up as antipersonnel mines went off. State authorities and organs of government do not provide any official information about the use of mines to civil sector, nongovernmental organizations, or parties.
Nongovernmental organizations. The Society of Red Crescent in Uzbekistan was going to train specialists who would then inform local communities residing near the state frontier about the mine danger. However the Ministry of Defense refused to carry out this activity.
Within the framework of its humanitarian activity, nongovernmental organization “Rabat-Malik” carries out investigations into use, storage, and import/export of mines. Its scout club has joined the youth movement ICBL in order to increase public awareness, render assistance to the victims and conduct public anti-mine actions. In particular, three Uzbek representatives – the students of Tashkent institutes of higher education – took part in the Moscow meeting and training in January 2005.
Researchers from Landmine Monitor did not find any other organization concerned about the APM problem.
Convention for conventional weapons. On August 30, 1997, Uzbekistan joined the Convention for prohibition or restriction on use of specific conventional weapons, which are deemed to inflict excessive damages or have unselective actions (Geneva, October 1, 1980). The Convention and Protocols I, II, III to the Convention have become effective since March 29, 1998. Protocol IV has become effective in the country since July 30, 1998. Researchers from Landmine Monitor detected no fact of offense against the Convention by the government of Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan joined the following conventions, as well:
1) On August 29, 1998, the International Convention for Bomb Terrorism (New York, January 12, 1998);
2) December 26, 1997, and having become effecting since August 8, 1999 the Convention for labeling plastic explosives for the purpose of detection (Montreal, March 1, 1991);
3) The Convention for prohibition of military or other hostility against environment (December 10, 1976) that has been effective in the country since May 26, 1993. Researchers from Landmine Monitor believe that animal mortality in nature reserves partially located within a mined frontier area is an infringement of the abovementioned 1976 Convention.
In 2002 – 2004, the Tashkent office of OSCE conducted six workshops on conventional light firearms control and their smuggling and illegal use detection, for personnel of the Committee for State Frontier Protection and State Custom Committee6.
PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION
Industrial bases for manufacture mines in Uzbekistan have been incorporated by autumn of 1941 when in republic have arrived the equipment and the machine from the evacuated defensive enterprises of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia. During the Second world war Uzbekistan has made 1,0 million mines and shells( ). Military historians from the Tashkent museum of fighting glory informed, that mines were made up to the middle of 1950th years for the Soviet army and armies of the countries of socialist camp ( ). All defensive enterprises were extremely allied submission, and the government of republic did not know quantity and assortment of a made ammunition.
Within the next 50 years of a mine in Uzbekistan were not made. Meanwhile, in the mobilization task of the government of the USSR manufacture of mines by the industry of Uzbekistan was provided. In 1993 the Uzbek government has removed from this task manufacture of sea mines, having left anti-tank and land mines ( ). The letter to address of researchers Landmine Monitor the first deputy minister of economy Galina Saidova has noted, that the information on manufacture land mines is in the competence of the Ministry of Defense ( ).
In the note dated July 31, 2001, Mr. Sadik Safaev, the Ambassador of Uzbekistan in the USA, mentioned that Uzbekistan did not produce APM.
Saidkarim Saidkhanov ( ), head of the mobilization resources department ( ), stated that civil enterprises are allowed to produce ammunition only by mobilization order of the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan # 529-27, 1992. Therefore, the military is responsible for exercising control of volume, quality and assortment of the products. Meanwhile, according to a former employee of the ministry, the existing processing lines at some enterprises of heavy industry allow to produce a good deal of APM ( ).
Private industrial companies and firms are not currently involved in military production. The researchers from Landmine Monitor did not noticed any ‘artesian’ or ‘homemade’ APM production by individuals, illegal workshops or crime organizations except for bombs that were used by bomb-terrorists during the terrorist attacks in spring and summer 2004.
Mines are transported in compliance with adopted safety requirements for hazardous cargo transportation. Mines are stored without fuses in wooden/metal containers and are transported in army trucks.
The source in the Ministry of Defense has noted, that transportation of mines is carried out also by special trains. During this moment all mines unfit for action also are disabled.
STOCKPLING/DESTRUCTION AND USE
Mines are stored in wooden/metal containers in the warehouses of the Ministry of Defense and Committee for State Frontier Protection (CSFP). Their conditions and terms of storage are unknown as such information is classified as secret. Some mines are known to be disposed of, being exploded on special grounds.
At present, APM are used by frontier troops of the Committee for State Frontier Protection. By different estimates some 50,000 to 200,000 APM were placed along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz, Uzbek-Tajik, and Uzbek-Afghan borders ( ). CSFP officially refused to comment the data and provided no relevant figures in this respect ( ). The former operative employee of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense has declared, that this figure can reach up to 350 thousand units( ). Departments of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan have no APM at their disposal and have never borrowed the mines from other ‘power’ ministries for their operations.
APM are never assigned to civil sector for storage or use, particularly for blasting operations in mining industry, irrigation, and construction works.
MINE CLEARANCE
On June 18, 2004, Uzbekistan’s Minister of Defense, Kadyr Gulyamov, stated the government would readily consider the issue of mine clearing on the state frontier, though this information was never brought to general public’s attention.
A meeting of Dmitriy Rupel, Acting Chairman of OSCE and Slovenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, with top government officials and members of parliament of Uzbekistan, was held in Tashkent, on February 16 during his mission to Central Asia. At the press-conference, he stated: “OSCE, and particularly Slovenia, will readily provide assistance to Uzbekistan in mine clearing and frontier protection. We have relevant experience, specialists and methodology that we are willing to share. I shall offer it to my colleague Mr. Elyar Ganiev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan” ( ). The researchers from Landmine Monitor are not aware of any facts that Slovenian field engineers are involved in mine clearing on the Uzbek border.
By the beginning of March 2004, the Uzbek party completed mine clearing around Uzbek enclave Shakhimardan ( ) located on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Two citizens of Kyrgyzstan are known to die there, and three more wounded. Damage of livestock blown up on the minefields was estimated to be 1.756 million Soums. An appropriate note about mine clearing outcome was submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan to the government of Kyrgyzstan.
Mine clearing around another Uzbek enclave Soh was suspended in autumn 2004 and resumed in spring 2005 ( ). As the representative of Kirghiz Ministry of Defense Kamid Dzhabbarov has declared, mine clearing along a part of Ferghana valley on border with Kyrghyzstan has been temporarily suspended owing to shortage of the equipment, including barriers and a barbed wire, necessary for good safety borders ( ).
By estimates of the experts from Kyrgyzstan’s Parliamentary Security Committee the minefield around enclaves Soh and Shakhimardan is not less than 250 m wide and have high mining density (from 2,000 to 3,000 mines per one km). By autumn 2004, Kyrgyz field engineers cleared of mines an area of 27 ha in the frontier zone ( ).
Experts, who have privately met with the researchers of Landmine Monitor ( ), indicated the following difficulties of mine clearing:
· Inconsistency between the real location of mines and minefield maps because of natural phenomena (mudflows, landslides, etc.);
· Some minefield maps missing.
Mine clearing is performed manually with no heavy-duty equipment involved. The mine clearing control in the area is exercised by frontier troops. Civil sector represented by local administration and local governance bodies are barred from the process.
Researchers Landmine Monitor have no data, that the Uzbek government is going to clear of mines the Uzbek-Afghani border. According to a source in the Ministry of Defense, it is improbable, as the nearest years it is not expected normalization of a situation in Afghanistan and danger to Uzbekistan on the part of the rests of groups " Taliban " and Islamic movement of Uzbekistan exists.
MINE AWARENESS EDUCATION
Pulat Avdullakhanov, a representative of the national Society of Red Crescent in Uzbekistan told that his organization together with the Regional representative office of the International Committee of Red Cross in Central Asia (ICRC) conducted the training “How to conduct public awareness mine danger program” under the Agreement with the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan dated August 2004. This training was held in the national training centre of Red Crescent in Uzbekistan, September 3 – 7, 2004 and was attended by 28 employees from the head office and regional units of the Red Crescent Society in Uzbekistan (RCSU) ( ).
In their letter, Uktamhon Vakhidova, the Chairman of RCSU and Pascal Unt, the Deputy Chief of ICRC in Central Asia, informed Mr. K. Gulyamov, the Minister of Defense, that experts had been trained in planning, organization and monitoring of the public mine danger awareness activity aimed to prevent people from getting mined. In this letter they requests to let them know when the specialists are allowed to start the program implementation in Uzbekistan ( ).
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied only to the ICRC informing that the Ministry of Defense had considered the proposal and believed that due to mine clearing at some sections of the Uzbek frontier it was “unnecessary to conduct any public mine danger awareness activity” ( ).
Location of mined fields along the Uzbek frontier and therefore the danger they represent are not brought local people’s attention. However, the frontier guards and militia posts do not let the local people approach the minefields.
According to the press, some 2,000 sign-posts warning of mine danger will be installed on the Tajik side of the Uzbek-Tajik border (spreading for 960 km along the border). This project is financed by the UNDP and US government ( ). A sum of 98,000 USD will be assigned for this purpose. The project does not provide mine clearing, as it – a prerogative of the Uzbek armed forces.
VICTIM ASSISTENCE
In the middle of February seven persons, the citizens of Tajikistan, were mined on the Tajik-Uzbek frontier, two of them died at the scene. The deceased, 19 years old Mansurdjon Buraliev and 22 years old Uralboy Julbekov, were residents of village Punuk, the Asht district (Sogd province). They were grazing livestock when stepped on antipersonnel mines. The others, Abdusalom Shodiev, Hasanboy Karimov, Hamidullo Tursunkulov, Huseinboy Djuraev and Abubakir Djuraev were hospitalized to a local hospital with wounds of different heaviness. 30 heads of cattle and 21 heads of small livestock exploded on the minefields, too ( ).
Only during the first two months of the year 2005, 10 Tajik citizens exploded on Uzbek landmines. In total, 74 citizens of Tajikistan residing near the Uzbek-Tajik border have died and 80 wounded since 1999 ( ).
No assistance from Uzbekistan was rendered to the victims. The Uzbek party conceals the facts, gives no comments and classifies the information as secret. Moreover, a representative of the Ministry of Health ( ) stated that this organization had no information of Uzbek citizens who had suffered from antipersonnel mines and that this issue was beyond the competence of this government institution. She also stated that “such information was not to be given out to the first comer” ( ) and therefore indirectly confirmed availability of relevant statistic data. In the meantime, researchers from Landmine Monitor found out that only in the Tashkent Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense three military men that suffered from mines were treated during the period from the issuance of the last report to April 2005.
During the meeting with the researchers from Landmine Monitor an informal representative of the Ministry of Health confirmed that accidents caused by mine explosions were reported and classified as secret and not subject to disclosure ( ). He told that four civilians residing near the Uzbek-Tajik border are known to have been mined. All of them were treated in district hospitals.
The enterprises of public health services rendering services to invalids, have the certain privileges. In particular, according to the current legislation, from the tax to the added cost production of the enterprises specialized on manufacture of artificial limb-orthopedic products, stock for invalids and rendering of services to invalids on orthopedic prosthetics, production of medical - industrial workshops are released(exempted) at medical establishments ( ).
NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs non-state armed groups (particularly, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan dislocated on uncontrolled areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan) and organized/unorganized crime groups have no antipersonnel mines and do not use them to achieve their crime objectives.
Meanwhile, one of employees of the Ministry of Emergency Measures of Uzbekistan informed, that saw, how his(its) colleagues removed extensions manual a pomegranate which were put by extremists in mountain places where passed fights by summer of 2000 ( ).
In spring and summer, 2004, the terrorists employed self-made explosives (bombs and so called ‘belts of shahids’) in public places, governmental and diplomatic institutions in Tashkent, and in a private house in Bukhara. However the self-made explosives can not be referred to antipersonnel mines. Some of the militia personnel, civilians and the bomb-terrorists themselves died during these terrorist attacks. Researchers Landmine Monitor have no the information, that the governmental armies and rising informal groups to Andizhan (on May, 13-14, 2005) in fighting collisions with each other used land mines or mines - traps.
Alisher TAKSANOV, researchers of Landmine Monitor
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