Media in uzbekistan
TRANSFORMATION, ANALYSIS, AND ISSUES BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT
Over the past 20 years, media outlets in Uzbekistan have undergone
major changes which have determined several stages in their development.
The changes have occurred both due to the political and economic
liberalisation, as well as the country’s independence.
The first stage includes media development prior to 1986. During this
period, official Communist state monopoly demanded an ever-increasing
influence of the ideological machine on the people’s consciousness, particularly
by means of the press and television/radio broadcasting. In this
sense, the quantitative characteristics of the media were unsurpassed. To
turn to statistics: while in 1980 the number of books and brochures published
in Uzbekistan was 2,169 (including 973 in Uzbek), in 1985 that
number increased to 2,265 (including 982 in Uzbek). Their combined circulation
increased from 34.6 million copies (22.9 million in Uzbek) to
41.7 million copies (23.7 million in Uzbek), which meant an increase
from 2,170 to 2,285 copies per 1,000 people.1
Between 1980 and 1985, the number of magazines, bulletins, and
brochures grew from 83 to 88 (with Uzbek-language publications, conversely,
decreasing from 35 to 32), while their combined yearly circulation
went up from 132.3 million to 144.6 million copies (in Uzbek, from
92.9 million to 106.8 million copies). Meanwhile, per 1,000 people, magazine
circulation decreased from 8,288 to 7,394 copies.
The number of newspapers likewise increased from 281 to 286 (including
Uzbek language newspapers, which went up from 190 to 195); their
combined yearly circulation went up from 896 million to 1,031.4 million
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
1 “National Economy of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, 1990. Tashkent, Uzbekistan”, 1991, p. 129-130.
266
copies (in Uzbek, from 658.2 million to 775.5 million copies). Newspaper
circulation per 1,000 people went down from 308 to 301 copies.
One must note that the vast majority of newspapers, magazines, and
bulletins were distributed through subscription, which was implemented
among individuals and organizations on a “voluntary-compulsory
basis”, and in accordance with a purchase order established by the state
authorities. However, considering the insignificant cost of the publications,
the subscription campaign was not too damaging to family or
industrial budgets.
As for television, Uzbekistan had a single republic-wide station, with
local state television stations functioning from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. daily in
the regions. In addition, programmes from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were broadcast once weekly, while All-
Union and Russian stations broadcast on a permanent basis. City and
republic-wide radio stations broadcast in Russian, Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh,
Turkmen, and Kyrgyz, along with re-broadcasting of programmes by the
All-Union Mayak radio station.
The second stage of media development was between 1986 and
1991, in the times of glasnost and perestroika, proclaimed by Mikhail
Gorbachev. Influenced by political liberalisation, the number of media
outlets grew along with their quality, which became possible due to the
elimination (albeit not complete) of censorship, broadening of the subjects
covered (to include those previously forbidden), as well as the
emergence of real journalism, one that truthfully reflected the current
situation. In 1990 alone, 2,080 books were published in Uzbekistan,
with a total circulation of 51 million copies (2,482 copies per 1,000
people). The number of magazines and other related periodicals
increased to 96 (with the number of Uzbek-language magazines increasing
to 38), while their combined yearly circulation went up to 171.8
million copies (133.6 in Uzbek), which translated into 8,375 copies per
1,000 people. As for newspapers, there were 311 of them in 1990 (with
179 in Uzbek), with the combined yearly circulation of 1,211.1 million
copies (895.5 million in Uzbek). The newspaper circulation per 1,000
people increased to 334 copies.
Alisher Taksanov
267
Many Uzbek journalists dubbed this period “the golden age”, since
freedom of speech and expression was allowed, with censorship reduced
to a minimum. In 1990, the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan adopted the
Law on Media, which established the status, goals, and functions of media
outlets, along with proclaiming democratic principles of development,
political pluralism, and rejecting an ideological monopoly. Later on, in
1997, this Law re-appeared in a new edition, which substantially worsened
conditions for media activity.
The third period went on from 1992 until May 2002, with mass media
developing in a newly independent Uzbek state. This was a complicated
period, characterised by, on one hand, a reduction of state subsidies to the
media (and the subsequent necessity to adapt to new economic conditions),
and, on the other hand, the state’s rejection of democratic principles,
intensification of both censorship and the personality cult of the
head of state, and persecution of opposition and dissent. While during the
first two years of Uzbekistan’s independence it was relatively uncomplicated
to establish a new periodical or a private television station, in succeeding
years this process was burdened by strict official and unofficial
restrictions, which caused a decrease in the share of independent media.
Following the publication by the non-state-owned Stock Exchange Herald
of the East newspaper of an article entitled “Russia Does Not Want
to Be a Milk Cow”, the government granted the Central Inspection on
Protecting State Secrets in the Press (UzLit) unlimited censorship authority.
A universal examination of all periodicals ensued, with loyalty to
Islam Karimov’s political regime as one of the criteria. A number of media
outlets belonging to opposition associations (the Erk Party, the Birlik
movement, and others) were closed, along with some electronic media
outlets, such as the Europa Plus and Moi Gorod radio stations. Local
authorities closed down a private television station in Khorezm; Shukhrat
Babadzhanov, its director, was forced to leave the country and seek political
asylum in Germany.
For political reasons, stations such as the BBC, Voice of America, and
Radio Liberty have been unable to secure FM frequencies for broadcasting
in Uzbekistan. The Tashkent-based Sesame radio station has likewise
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
268
had a serious confrontation with the authorities. Internews, an international
organization, has had difficulties with the distribution of its television
programmes through the country.
In addition, market economic conditions caused the closure of multiple
publications, whether created by state institutions (including departmental
and territorial authorities) or private enterprises. The central press,
funded from the state budget, managed to stay afloat. Those commercial
media outlets able to employ principles of marketing and management,
to be competitive with respect to advertising and public relations, and
find their readership, also managed to survive, despite restrictions. By
early 2001, the majority of newspapers (including nationwide ones) had
circulations of 2,500 to 20,000 copies. These figures demonstrate that an
increase in the number of periodicals had not resulted in the increase of
their volume. On the contrary, circulation has sharply decreased, while
sale prices have soared, and problems with distribution have emerged.
The monopolistic position of the Matbuot Tarqatuvchi (former
Soyuzpechat) distribution agency has resulted in the emergence of private
distribution companies offering their services to nationwide and local
periodicals. Thus, in Tashkent alone, there exist such private distributors
as Kalion, BGL, Alexander Market, and others, which strive to cover not
just the capital, but the entire country. However, it is difficult for them to
compete with Matbuot Tarqatuvchi, which over many years has established
connections with transportation enterprises, and has enjoyed certain
benefits from the state. For example, according to a governmental
decree, within the time period from 1 May 2000 until 31 December 2003,
Matbuot Tarqatuvchi and any companies that are affiliated with it are only
required to pay gross revenue tax in the amount of 5 per cent, with an
additional contribution to the Republican Road Fund in the amount of
0.5 per cent of the gross revenue. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Finance is
required, within the same time period, to provide the distribution agency
with funds from the state budget, in order to compensate it for 50 per cent
of the costs of air and railroad freight of the periodical press. The government
has also recommended that the Ministry of Energy place Matbuot
Tarqatuvchi and any companies that are affiliated with it into the
Alisher Taksanov
269
privileged “fifth group” of electric energy consumers (non-profit consumers
and budget organizations). The national Uzbekiston Khavo Iullari
airline has also been asked to review its schedule of departures, to provide
for early-morning daily delivery of print media into the regional centres
and the Republic of Karakalpakstan.2
Needless to say, independent media networks have a multitude of problems,
including those of transporting their publications through customs,
taxation, and the unofficial negative view by the authorities to the distribution
of Russian, Kazakh, and any other non-Uzbek publications, especially
the ones that may be critical of Uzbekistan. Thus, the authorities
banned the import into Uzbekistan of the Kazakh Karavan newspaper,
along with Russian Moskovsky Komsomolets and Komsomolskaya Pravda.
On 8 September 2001, the customs office of the Tashkent Central railway
station seized 103 copies of the Central Asia and the Caucasus magazine,
published in Sweden. The Mirabad District Court of Tashkent ordered the
confiscation of all copies of this scientific magazine, based on a recommendation
by the experts of the Ministry of Culture.
The majority of Uzbekistan’s population continues to exist outside of
the information space. Print media do not reach many of the remote rural
regions. The only means of information there are television and radio, as
well as telephone conversations, and, much like in the times prior to the
revolution, the local markets. It is through the travelling merchants and
customers that the local residents learn of events in the country.
On the other hand, the potential reach of the electronic media is also
limited, since not every family owns a television or radio set. In certain
mountain regions, the reception is quite poor, and sometimes nonexistent.
Meanwhile, the popularity of the Internet as an information source
continues to grow. According to data provided by the Uzbek Agency for
Communications and Information Technologies, the number of Internet
users in Uzbekistan in 2002 was 275,000 people, which is more than twice
the same number in 2001. Up to 72.9 per cent of Internet users are located
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
2 “No Longer Under Lock and Key”, The Business Herald of the East, 20 April 2000.
270
in Tashkent. The majority of users (almost 70 per cent) utilise public Internet
access locations, of which there are over 100 throughout the country.
Internet journalism has emerged. An increasing number of independent
reporters use the world wide web for distribution of their information.
Certain official media outlets, such as the Narodnoe slovo and Business
Partner of Uzbekistan newspapers, are also starting to be involved with
the Internet by offering readers electronic versions.
The UzA information agency has launched its own web site, and covers
events in Uzbekistan through the Internet. The Uzreport information
portal (which doubles as the owner of the weekly Business Herald of the
East newspaper) is also popular with domestic and foreign readers alike.
Information is published on its web site in Russian, English, and Uzbek,
and is widely used by analysts. However, one must admit that the aforementioned
agencies publish primarily news articles and reference data,
while being cautious with any analytical materials, especially those
regarding politics and economic reforms. That is due to the fact that
Uzbek authorities control all of the information that comes from the “uz”
domain zone.
To provide some numbers characterising this third developmental stage,
as of 10 January 2001, 719 media outlets were registered in Uzbekistan,
with 507 newspapers, 157 magazines, 4 information agencies, and 51 electronic
media (television and radio stations). Out of 507 newspapers, 77
were nationwide, 162 regional, 47 city, 176 district, and 45 industry- and
factory-specific newspapers. Out of the same 507, 394 were state-owned,
63 public, and 50 belonged to commercial or religious organizations. 133
newspapers were departmental. As for magazines, 99 were state-owned,
34 public, and 27 belonged to commercial or religious organizations.
One must note that the media in Uzbekistan has an international
flavour: publications are produced in the official Uzbek language, as
well as in Russian, English, Kazakh, Tajik, Karakalpak, Bukharan-Jewish,
and Korean. Considering that Uzbeks comprise over 80 per cent of
the population, it is reasonable that the majority of periodicals should
be published in the official language. Incidentally, that aspect is regulated
in accordance with the National Law on the Official Language.
Alisher Taksanov
271
Experts specify that this concerns local media to a larger degree, due to
a more mono-ethnic national composition of the regional population.
Meanwhile, print media that are distributed nationwide are usually multilingual.
Experts agree that the most numerous group of media outlets is that of
public and political newspapers, targeting mass readership and informing
the population of all facets of life in the country, as well as in any given
region, city, or district. This group includes such newspapers as Khalk suzi,
Narodnoe slovo, Toshkent khakitati, Taskentskaya Pravda, Toshkent
okshomi, Evening Tashkent, Ovozi tochik (in Tajik), Nurly zhol (in Kazakh),
as well as newspapers in the regions, and districts (khokimiyats).
The second group includes media outlets published by officially
recognised parties and public organizations. These newspapers include
Uzbekiston ovozi, Golos Usbekistana, Milliy tiklanish, Adolat, Vatan,
Fidokor, Ishonch, Ishonch-Doverie, and others.
The third group is comprised of the so-called general cultural publications,
such as the ones covering literature, fiction, education, and
humanitarian and spiritual aspects of society. These include such newspapers
as Uzbekiston adabiyoti va san’ati, Teacher of Uzbekistan, Oila
va zhamiyat, Sport, Ma’rifat, Markazij Osiyo madaniyati, Ialb kuzi, and
others, as well as such magazines as Zvezda Vostoka, Shark yulduzi, Theatre,
San’at, Saodat, Mushtum, Zhakhon adabiyoti, Yoshlik, Yosh kuch,
Gulkhan, Guncha, and many others.
It would be inexcusable to leave out the presence of religious publications
in Uzbekistan. The Muslim Islom nuri newspaper and Khidoyat
magazine are published in the country, as well as the Christian Orthodox
Slovo zhizni.
In addition, there is a significant number of periodicals covering various
issues of science and research, as well industry-specific publications
providing information on certain sectors of the national economy.
Recently, there has been an increase in the number of newspapers and
magazines oriented toward assisting the development of entrepreneurship,
and establishment of inter-governmental economic ties and mutually
beneficial trade and economic cooperation among sovereign states.
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
272
These publications include such newspapers as the Khamkor, Business
Partner, Business Partner of Uzbekistan, Mulkdor, Mening mulkihm, Private
Property, Bank akhborotnomasi, Bank Gazette, Savdogar, Business
Herald of the East, Kuch adolatga, and others, as well as such magazines
as the Bozor, pul va credit (Market, Money, and Credit), Financial Market
Review, Economic Review, PressTIZH, Wholesaler, Business Osiyo,
Investvesti, and others.
There are also periodicals published by enterprises created jointly by
Uzbek and foreign institutions. These include the Fim’S magazine of the
Uzbek-Indian Salamander company, the British American Tobacco
Uzbekistan yangiliklari bulletin of a joint Uzbek-British enterprise, and
the Rastr publication of a joint Uzbek-British “Rastr” publishing and
printing company.
The following information agencies are active in Uzbekistan: the
National Information Agency (UzA), the Zhakhon of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the non-state-owned Turkiston-Press, the information
Agency of Karakalpakstan, and the Information Centre of the Presidential
Staff. Ministries, official departments, and enterprises also have their
own information centres.
Additionally, during the third stage of media development, 51 electronic
media outlets (including 30 television stations and companies, 6
radio stations, and 15 television/radio companies) held broadcasting
licenses. Out of that number, 25 were state-owned and 26 were commercial
(of which 14 were private, with citizens of Uzbekistan as their direct
or indirect founders). Two television/radio stations founded by joint enterprises
were also registered and now hold broadcasting licenses: the Kalamak-
TV station (founded by the joint Uzbek-American Kalamak company),
and the Sesame radio station (founded by the joint Uzbek-American
Rubicon Radio Systems Company).
The fourth stage of media development in Uzbekistan commenced
with the abolishment of censorship on 7 May 2002. Erkin Kamilov, the
country’s head censor, retired, the staff of censors was dissolved, while
on 4 July a Presidential Decree reformed the State Press Committee into
the Uzbek Press and Information Agency.
Alisher Taksanov
273
A subsequent governmental decree confirmed the Resolution on this
agency, establishing it as an executive body responsible for developing
and implementing state policy with regard to press and information. The
agency is delegated with monitoring unconditional adherence to all constitutional
rights and legislation regarding independent media activity, as
well as providing the guarantees for freedom of speech and the media. It
is also responsible for assisting the development of media, and the publishing
and printing business, in order to fully satisfy the information
needs of the people. The agency’s objectives include the issues of licensing
publishing activity, standardisation and certification of the technical
base, analysis of economic, social, technical, and legal issues, as well as
development of suggestions for resolving the problems that exist in the
realm of press and information.
Among the agency’s rights is the development and approval of normative
documents that are compulsory for all, regardless of the form of
ownership. In addition, the resolutions and recommendations of the
agency issued within its jurisdiction are also compulsory for all Ministries,
departments, local governing bodies, enterprises and organizations,
and management units, regardless of the form of ownership, as well
as officials and individual citizens. In the event of systematic failure to
adhere to the press and information legislation, the agency has the right
to legally suspend the publishing licenses and registration certificates of
the media outlets in question. Most importantly, the agency is strictly prohibited
from exercising any censorship, editing, or other forms of unlawful
interference with the activities of media.
There is no doubt that the government continues to carefully follow
the situation with the media, realising its importance in the state’s political
system. On 27 June 2003, President Islam Karimov congratulated all
media employees on the occasion of their professional holiday. In his congratulatory
message, he noted that all media employees were making an
important contribution to the development of democratic press in the
country by their work and creative potential. “Today, as we are living in
the age of globalisation, witnessing an ‘information explosion’, that phenomenon
peculiar of the XXI century, as we are a part of the rapid devel-
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
274
opment of information communications, we must reflect on bringing our
media in line with world standards, and on individual contributions”, said
Karimov. “Our cherished goal is to build a new state, a new life, based
on the harmony of national ideas and values common to all mankind, and
to create a society in which every individual has the opportunity to freely
express his thoughts, and live in friendship and partnership with developed
democratic countries.”3
According to the leader of Uzbekistan, information transfer via the
most modern technologies is becoming common, and any attempts or
actions aimed at restricting freedom of speech are senseless.
“Media outlets must not limit themselves to mere coverage and reflection
of reality. They must first and foremost serve as advocates of the
people’s interests, while journalists must display a lot of selflessness in
this complicated area that demands a strong will”, the Presidential message
continued.
“Another goal that the media are facing is the necessity to master professional
skills, to train qualified experts, analysts, and commentators.
One must admit that journalists sometimes lack courage. It is a difficult
process to give up the habits which over the course of 70 years have
become one’s second nature; habits such as a lack of critical assessment
of the authorities, or such archaic stereotypes as taking an official’s word
as law. Currently, journalists need to actively participate in the elimination
of these vestiges, to make every effort to instil the atmosphere of free
thinking in society”, said Karimov.
Statistically speaking, as of early 2003, 984 media outlets were registered
in Uzbekistan. Out of those, 582 were newspapers, 167 were magazines,
231 were electronic media outlets, and 4 were information agencies.
Out of the 231 electronic media outlets, 56 were television and radio
stations, and 24 were cable television stations. One must note that this
“abundance” of media outlets does not serve as evidence of their quality.
State-owned newspapers’ circulation does not exceed 10,000 copies. The
so-called “yellow press”, i.e., digests that reprint information from Russ-
Alisher Taksanov
3 Pravda Vostoka, 27 June 2003.
275
ian media, or from the Internet, regarding rock, television, and show business
stars, music, gossip, jokes, and fashions, remain most popular. Likewise,
popular are the only Russian periodicals available, Argumenty i fakty
and Trud. The more serious media in Uzbekistan still have not been
claimed by a large number of consumers.
This is partly due to the fact that the information published by Uzbek
media continues to be somewhat emasculated and pseudo-patriotic. There
are very few analytical materials published, and even the few that do make
it to the pages of newspapers and magazines are one-sided and clearly
exhibit government policies, while the opinions of alternative-minded
experts are not tolerated. Editorial offices do not wish to publish “sharpedged”
and “burning” materials, fearing subsequent repressions on the
part of the government. For example, the Oina newspaper remains unable
to resume its activity following its closure, initiated by the authorities.
Due to the “prickliness” of the published articles, the founder of the Vremya
i my newspaper closed it down under the pretence of financial insolvency.
The Zerkalo XX newspaper is likewise experiencing difficulties
with the authorities, occasionally publishing critical articles despite pressure
on its chief editor.
This situation was noticeable to the delegation of the Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) during its nine-day visit to Uzbekistan in May
2002. The delegation included Peter Arnett, member of the Board of
Directors of CPJ; Richard M. Murphy, CPJ’s Editorial and Program Director;
and Alex Lupis, Europe and Central Asia Programme Coordinator.
They conducted meetings with Uzbek government officials, local journalists,
foreign correspondents, Western diplomats, and human rights
activists, in Tashkent and Samarkand.
Despite the formal abolishment of preliminary censorship, which
occurred shortly prior to the visit by the CPJ delegation, local editors
were reminded by the authorities of their personal responsibility for any
publications regarding this visit, which has somewhat reduced the magnitude
of the event. CPJ representatives emphasised that Uzbek authorities
stimulated self-censorship by threatening critically-minded journalists
with prison terms. Other instruments of pressure included lawsuits
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
276
filed in non-independent courts, persecution by the police and security
agencies, discretionary resolutions on introducing normative acts pertaining
to the media, and politically inspired tax audits. As a result, local
journalists rarely write of official corruption, human rights violations, or
of the activities of opposition political parties or Islamic organizations.4
The CPJ delegation made several recommendations on improving the situation
with freedom of the media. Naturally, those recommendations were
ignored.
Attesting to that is the fact that the author of this article, following a
16-month-long run around on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
received a written denial for accreditation as a foreign journalist. No reason
was given for the denial. The National Security Service made every
effort to impede the author’s participation as a media representative at the
May 2003 Summit of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
which took place in Tashkent. Prior to that, there had been provocations
against the author by the police, as well as harassing of the author
through the Internet.
On 12 May 2003, Tashkent hosted a conference on World Press Freedom
Day. It was organized by the UN Mission, the OSCE Centre in
Tashkent, and the Open Society Institute Assistance Fund-Uzbekistan.
Well-known journalists and media managers representing both local and
nationwide newspapers, representatives of international and non-governmental
organizations, and members of the diplomatic corps took part in
the forum, discussing a wide range of issues concerning media development
in Uzbekistan.
In his opening remarks, Michael Barry Lane, permanent UNESCO
representative and the Acting UN Representative in Uzbekistan, stated
that World Press Freedom Day provided the opportunity to acknowledge
the bravery and persistence of many journalists who perished or risked
their lives in military conflict areas, including, most recently, in Iraq,
courageously fulfilling their duties. However, Barry Lane also stated that
the dangers that threaten journalists were not limited to times of military
Alisher Taksanov
4 Based on material by the Turkiston-Press information agency, July 2002.
277
conflict. Freedom of the media could often be restricted by laws and law
enforcement agencies, as well as by unlawful acts of violence, threats,
and intimidation. According to Barry Lane, the general situation with
freedom of the media had worsened in the past year.
“Our collective duty to journalists, who suffer for our sakes, must be
to at least declare a war on impunity”, Barry Lane said, adding that it
was important for all crimes to be investigated, and for all legal systems
and procedures to allow for punishment of those found guilty.
In concluding his opening remarks, the Acting UN Representative to
Uzbekistan quoted from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Message
on World Press Freedom Day 2003: “Unless ideas and information can
travel freely, both within frontiers and across them, peace will remain that
much more elusive. Where censorship is imposed, both democracy and
development are the losers. A free and independent press is the lifeblood
of strong, functioning societies, and a lifeline to progress itself.”
Uzbek journalists participating in the discussions emphasised that,
despite the abolishment of censorship, they were still subjected to pressure,
the use of the so-called “telephone right”, as well as instances of
self-censorship. The conference also raised such issues as the commercialisation
of mass media outlets, their dependence on founders and owners,
and problems with information access.
THE INTERNET AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MEDIA
Currently, the Internet is not considered a media outlet, although many
experts admit that it may serve as an alternative to media. An increasing
number of world wide web users obtain important information and news
from sources located both within and outside Uzbekistan. According to
the Uzbek Agency on Communications and Information Technologies,
the number of registered domains in the national “.uz” domain zone has
increased by 12.5 per cent since the beginning of 2003, reaching 650. As
of 1 January 2003, the number of registered domains was 570, a 22.3 per
cent increase from early 2002.
At the present time, the German Euracom Equipment GmbH serves
as the owner of all rights to the “.uz” domain zone. The company has
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
278
transferred these rights for the next three years to Tomas Ltd., which represents
its interests in Uzbekistan. In early 2003, Tomas Ltd. introduced
an average 20 per cent discount for domain registration services. Previously,
these services had cost 78 USD (for a registration period of one
year). According to the agency’s representatives, the lowering of the registration
cost has resulted in an increase in the number of registered
domains.
In mid-2000, the government of Uzbekistan adopted the Program for
Development of Computerisation and Information Communications
Technologies for 2002-2010. Within the framework of the Program, at
least 45,000 public Internet access points are to be created by 2010. It is
expected that the number of Internet users will grow by almost 60 times
(to 3.32 million) by 2010. Furthermore, the Program envisions that at
least 74 per cent of all state and local governing bodies will be provided
with Internet access (currently, only 8.2 per cent of them have such
access), in addition to at least 60 per cent of all management units.
The number of Internet access providers and operators in Uzbekistan
has exceeded 130 in early 2003. As of today, the number of state institutions
connected to the Internet is 286, while the number of management
units with Internet access is 5,123. For instance, there has been a negative
tendency of electronic censorship. Given the Internet’s increasing
influence as an important source of information, the government has
issued an unofficial directive for the private service providers to exercise
ideological control over web sites and information published on them, for
the purpose of restricting the Uzbeks’ access to certain sites. Since hundreds
of thousands of web sites exist throughout the world, it is impossible
to review all of them; hence web co-ordinating function was assumed
by special service agencies, which have the authority to limit access to
any particular Internet resource. For example, UzSiNet, an Internet service
provider, exercises censorship over such information portals as CentrAsia
(www.centresia.ru), Navigator (www.navi.kz), as well as such
abroad-based opposition movements as Erk and Birlik. The web site of
the Ozod Ovoz (A Free Voice) human rights organization, headed by journalist
Bobomurad Abdullaev, has been banned by the Uzbek authorities.
Alisher Taksanov
279
Service providers are blocking this site (www.ozodovoz.org), which not
only makes it impossible to access in Uzbekistan, but also does not allow
Abdullaev to post new information on it.
JOURNALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN UZBEKISTAN
The Union of Journalists in Uzbekistan ceased to be as such in the mid-
1990s, although there has been no official information attesting thereto.
Some sources claim that its leader continued to issue membership cards
to those journalists who wished to have one. However, that did not win
any prestige for the organization which no one wanted to know about.
The Foundation for Media Democratisation and Support, instituted by
a Presidential Decree, has likewise failed to become respectable and prestigious.
Over the many years of censorship and persecution of journalists,
this organization has never spoken out in their defence, nor has it
ever expressed its protest against government policies of suppressing freedom
of speech. Having limited itself to announcing the names of “the
journalists of the year” on Press Workers Day, this Foundation has gained
a reputation of a weak and second-rate “screw” in the state ideological
machine. Considering that the Foundation is currently headed by the former
Presidential press secretary, the independent journalists’ view of it
is far from cordial.
An attempt by several Tashkent journalists to create their own professional
organization has yielded no result. In 2001, Ruslan Sharipov, a
journalist and human rights activist, together with Inera Safargalieva, a
staff member of Radio Liberty, announced the creation of the Union of
Independent Journalists of Uzbekistan (UIJU), publicising that fact
through the Internet. However, due to a lack of support from their colleagues,
the ambitiousness of their plans, vagueness of their ideas, goals,
and programmes, as well as a conflict between the founders themselves,
the UIJU was never actually formed. Furthermore, Uzbek special service
agencies have managed to “nip” the idea “in the bud” by starting a
defamation campaign against the two journalists.
The non-governmental Ozod Ovoz organization has never received an
official status. Its leader, Bobomurad Abdullaev, has said that the prob-
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
280
lem is not just a lack of registration, but also the fact that the Tashkent
City Department of Justice has simply refused to accept the registration
application. Abdullaev is convinced that it has to do with the political
repression by the Karimov regime of all the dissidents.
In the mid-1990s, the Presidential Academy of State and Public Organization
and the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation instituted the
International Centre for Re-Training of Journalists, headed by Gulnara
Babadzhanova. This institution engaged in educational programs for
journalists representing print and electronic media, organized discussions
and interest clubs, and attracted foreign grants for research and
educational projects.
In the Bukhara Region, Asatillo Kudratov, a journalist, has managed to
register the Association of Journalists of Bukhara, with the objective of
uniting journalists and developing common. It is no secret that Kudratov’s
loyalty was scrutinised by Uzbek special services, which provided the
regional justice department with the permission to register the Association.
In late September 2003, the Tashkent City Department of Justice held
a ceremony of issuing an official registration to a new non-governmental,
non-profit organization, dubbed the Association of Foreign Correspondents
Accredited in Uzbekistan. Its Chairman Vilor Niyazmatov, the
ITAR-TASS Correspondent in Uzbekistan, announced that the organization’s
major goals were to protect the rights and interests of journalists
working for foreign newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations,
and information agencies. The organization likewise offered assistance
to foreign journalists in their professional activities, striving to provide
for a free dissemination of ideas and information, in accordance with
international law, as well as relevant legislation in Uzbekistan.
One must note that these changes did not occur because of the current
political regime dreaming of democracy. They occurred because of the
involvement of many international organizations (OSCE, ODIHR, EBRD,
NATO) and foreign states (US, Europe), which have exerted considerable
pressure on Islam Karimov’s government, pushing it toward serious political
reform. If it were not for this involvement, the Association of Foreign
Journalists would not have existed; and the News of Uzbekistan newspa-
Alisher Taksanov
281
per would not have been publishing certain analytical pieces on the country’s
economic situation by the “blacklisted” author of this article.
LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATION OF JOURNALISM
One should not belittle the fact that Uzbekistan’s legislative base regulating
the activities of media is quite impressive, both in its volume (that
is, the number of normative acts adopted) and in the breadth of aspects
covered. This base consists of documents of direct and indirect application.
The former include those providing for the political and legal functioning
of the media. For example:
International agreements:
• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of 10 October 1948),
which Uzbekistan signed in 1991;5
• The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (of 16
December 1966), which Uzbekistan signed in 1995.
International documents and agreements signed by Uzbekistan with
other countries, and pertaining to the creation of an information space
(for example, within the jurisdiction of the CIS, or that of Central Asia).
National Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan:
• on Media (adopted in June 1991; amended and edited on 26 December
1997);6
• on Protection of the Professional Activity of Journalists (adopted in
April 1997);7
• on Guarantees for Access to Information (adopted in April 1997);8
• on Publishing (adopted in August 1996);
• on Copyright and Related Rights (adopted in August 1996);9
• on Information Technologies (adopted on 7 May 1993);
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
5 Uzbekistan and International Human Rights Documents. Tashkent, Adolat, 1998.
6 Gazette of the Oliy Mazhlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1998, #1 (1261).
7 Narodnoe slovo, 26 April 1997.
8 Narodnoe slovo, 26 April 1997.
9 Narodnoe slovo, 17 September 1996.
282
• on Advertising (adopted on 25 December 1998);
• on Communications (of 13 January 1992);
• on Archives (of 15 April 1999);10
• on Telecommunications (of 20 August 1999);11
• on Protection of State Secrets (of 7 May 1993);12
• on the Official Language (of 1991);
Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers:
• on the Procedure for Media Registration in the Republic of Uzbekistan
(#160, of 15 April 1998);
• on Regulating Publishing in the Republic of Uzbekistan (#393, of 11
August 1997);
• on Rules Regulating the Activities of Correspondents of Foreign
Media in the Republic of Uzbekistan (#391, of 11 September 1998);13
Departmental documents:
• Statute on the Procedure of Mutual and Gradual Accreditation of Foreign
Media Representatives with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Uzbekistan (approved by the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on 1 February 1995).
In addition, this list of normative acts constituting the legislative foundation
for the media includes separate articles of the existing Codes
(Civil, Criminal, and Tax), as well as of other laws reflecting the activities
of the media (for example, the Law on the Referendum, on Presidential
Elections, on the Prosecutor’s Office, on Courts, on Elections to
the Oliy Mazhlis, on Citizens’ Petitions, and others).
Other laws regulate the activities of media outlets as management
units. These laws provide for certain tax, customs, and foreign investment
benefits for the media; these are general benefits, provided to small
and medium-size enterprises regardless of their area of activities. For
Alisher Taksanov
10 Narodnoe slovo, 7 May 1999.
11 Pravda Vostoka, 14 September 1999.
12 New Laws of Uzbekistan. Tashkent, Adolat, Issue 8, 1994.
13 Collection of Resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan. #9, 1998.
283
example, if the subsequent legislation of Uzbekistan worsens the investment
conditions, then foreign investments are treated for the next ten years
in accordance with the legislation that was active at the time of the investment.
The enterprises’ revenue tax rate decreases to 20 per cent with the
total production exports share of 5 - 10 per cent; it decreases to 30 per
cent with the exports share of 10 per cent to 20 per cent; to 40 per cent
with the exports share of 20 - 30 per cent; and to 50 per cent with the
exports share of over 30 per cent.
Another benefit is that, at the end of a fiscal year, any convertible currency
revenue received from the growth of the exports volume of goods
(jobs, services) is exempt from revenue tax. A revenue tax rate of 25 per
cent is imposed on joint enterprises with a foreign capital share of over
30 per cent, as well as on foreign enterprises, their offices, branches, and
subsidiaries. If an editorial office (or a publisher) exports self-manufactured
goods, they are not subject to excise tax; meanwhile, if a joint enterprise
produces export-oriented and import-substitution goods, it has a
right to receive tax credits for production development; i.e., a deferment,
for up to 2 years, of the budget payments of the VAT and land tax. If a
media outlet is a joint enterprise with a statutory fund of no less than
500,000 USD, it is exempt from the property tax. Furthermore, the import
into Uzbekistan of any private property by foreign citizens who are also
staff members of joint media enterprises, or of any articles required for
production, is exempt from customs duty.
JOURNALISM IN UZBEKISTAN: LATEST TENDENCIES
Despite the abundance of normative acts, according to polls conducted
among journalists only 31 per cent are aware of the aforementioned
Laws, and only 16 per cent have referred to the Laws in
their professional work.14 Journalists will continue to ignore the legal
field “until they are dismissed from press conferences or from a location
of coverage, until their notepads are confiscated, their film is
spoiled by exposure to light, their critical stories are taken out of news-
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
14 Sociological data provided by the Asia-Monitor Centre, March-April 2000, 100 people polled.
284
papers or off the air, and so forth”,15 as R. Gafurov, a legal expert,
writes in the Journalist’s Abridged Legal Handbook.
In Gafurov’s opinion, “the low exposure of media rights violations is
determined by the tolerance of media representatives, who often demonstrate
little ability to resort to legal protection”. Indeed, many journalists
do not wish to use legal mechanisms to increase the effectiveness of their
work, fearing that by doing so, that may complicate their relations with
the sources of information, or with official bodies that regulate the issues
in question. “It is better to exercise an Eastern approach, that is, obtain
information through personal contacts, gifts, or bribes; if that is not effective,
it is better to forget about the issue altogether, and not write about
it”, claims Anna Merkurieva, a journalist.
These conclusions are confirmed by a poll conducted by the Asia-Monitor
Centre: thus, journalists in Kazakhstan are more likely to work independently,
searching for information on their own, while their Uzbek colleagues
are more likely to use official papers in working on their articles
(see Table 1), and rely exclusively on the opinions expressed by the higher
authorities. In the words of an employee of the Akhborot television programme
(who wished to remain anonymous), “by so doing, we protect
ourselves from inaccuracies and prevent potential conflicts with the
authorities. It is better to avoid such conflicts, and criticise only what the
authorities themselves point out. One’s own opinion aired without prior
approval from the management may hurt one’s career, financial standing,
and may even get one fired.”
Alisher Taksanov
15 Tashkent, Internews-Uzbekistan, 1999, p. 9.
285
Journalists’ answers to the question
“How do you receive information?”
(only positive answers provided; in per cent) 16
Thus, despite a common history, similar mentality, religion, and language
in the two countries, the state of democratic development differs
from Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan, and is directly reflected in the development
of the media. “Our journalists are braver when it comes to obtaining,
analysing, and publishing information; they are aware that at any
given moment, they may turn to legal experts, who will provide the necessary
protection, and that they will be supported by their colleagues”,
says Ruslan Minulin, a correspondent for the Kazakh Karavan newspaper.
“Unfortunately, I have not observed the same in Uzbekistan. People
seem to be afraid of something here, listening spellbound to the government,
as if asking, ‘who should I bark at, and how?’ That is completely
abnormal for journalism.”
Uzbek legislation does contain a definition of a journalist. In particular,
Article 3 of the Law on Protection of the Professional Activity of Journalists
states that “a journalist is a person employed by a media outlet of
the Republic of Uzbekistan or a foreign state, or else working for such
on a contractual basis; and engaged in collecting, analysing, and disseminating
information on certain subjects.” In other words, this text provides
for a specific connection between a journalist and a media outlet;
only through an employment agreement may a journalist be considered
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
Answers Kazakhstan Uzbekistan
I receive press releases or reports from official authorities 20 49
I conduct my own investigations, participate in events, and report 59 34
I poll witnesses and participants 87 56
I write articles as assigned by the authorities “made to order” 6 57
I write articles “made to order” by persons not affiliated
with the authorities (advertising excluded) 36 10
16 Sociological data provided by the Trans-Asia Centre, March-April 2000, 100 people polled.
286
as such. An article in the Law on Media considers a media employee any
person who appears “on the staff of an editorial office and is engaged in
collection, analysis, editing, and preparation of stories”.
In this sense, national legislation does not provide for the existence of
journalists who are free, i.e., independent from any particular media outlets
and, consequently, from censorship: the kind of journalists who would
independently collect information on any particular event(s) and publish
it in those media outlets which they trusted, wished to collaborate with,
or wished to sell their information to for profit (after all, information is
a commodity). That is why it is so difficult to work in Uzbekistan for
those who practice private journalism (they cannot receive accreditation
with state institutions, and do not have any legal documents giving them
the right to engage in journalistic activities); incidentally, the existence
of private detectives is likewise not provided for by Uzbek legislation.
Journalists are bound to be affiliated with editorial offices, which dictate
their own will and directives; meanwhile, the editorial offices themselves
are tightly controlled by the government. In other words, everyone is controlled
by someone else, which protects official authorities from “the
fourth power”. Anyone who can independently collect, analyse, and sell
information, circumventing “official” institutions (those of censorship,
for example), poses a threat to the pseudo-democratic systems, as the
ones in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Therefore, any kind of free journalism
is out of the question here.
Meanwhile, world practice does know of a solution to this problem.
The Republic of Armenia, for instance, has treated the issue of independent
media representatives rather competently, stating, in Article 1 of its
Media Law, that “no special access to media activities shall be required”,
and in Article 2 of the same Law, “A journalist has the right to engage in
professional activity independently, without representing any particular
media outlet.” For purposes of attributing an official status to such an
individual, the Law further stipulates that “he has the right to receive a
certificate of a ‘free journalist’ from an official media registration institution”.
Certainly, in order to avoid abuse of this privilege, “the certificate
may be issued upon submitting by the journalist in question of no
Alisher Taksanov
287
fewer than three letters of reference from media executives”.17 This progressive
provision has legalised the activities of many journalists, promoting
the development of “the fourth power” in Armenia, and raising
the social status and significance of media representatives. Russian media
legislation likewise introduces the term “special status”; Article 52 states
that a “professional journalistic status shall be applicable to… authors
not bound to editorial offices through employment or other contractual
obligations, but recognised as freelance authors or correspondents pursuing
assignments on behalf of editorial offices”.
However, even if such an article was introduced in Uzbekistan, there
would be no guarantee that it would be adhered to or abused by the executive
institutions. Such abuse often occurs with regard to other, existing
articles. For example, Article 29 of the Uzbek Law on Media states that
“Representatives and offices of foreign media shall conduct their activities
in the Republic of Uzbekistan after being accredited with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.” Elsewhere, Article 6 of the Principal Rules Regulating
the Activities of Correspondents of Foreign Media in the Republic of
Uzbekistan states that “a decision regarding the accreditation of a permanent
correspondent shall be made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Uzbekistan within a time period of no more than two
months”.18 How are these provisions adhered to in reality? Let us consider
some facts. Thus, Shamil Baigin, a correspondent for Reuters, waited
almost two years to receive his accreditation; Alisher Azimov, a representative
for the Finances of Russia, did not receive his accreditation at all in
1995. A similar situation befell Alexander Djumaev, former representative
of the Swedish Central Asia and the Caucasus magazine, and Inera Safargalieva,
a correspondent for Radio Liberty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
does not respond to written enquiries, while in telephone conversations
Ministry officials state that the issue has not been resolved, and appear
uncertain as to when it may be resolved. Meanwhile, the Ministry refuses
to provide a written registration denial, since it would be difficult to jus-
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
17 Media Law of Kazakhstan and Other Foreign Countries. Almaty, Daniker, 2001, p. 165.
18 Appendix to the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, #391. Collection
of Resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, #9, 1998.
288
tify that to a media outlet which is well-known and popular in democratically
developed states, and covers the situation in Uzbekistan from a scientific
standpoint. Besides, Article 14 of the Law on Protection of the Professional
Activity of Journalists would be applicable in this case, as it states
that designated officials are to be held responsible for “impeding any lawful
professional activities of journalists by means of unjustified accreditation
refusal or unjustified accreditation suspension”. However, the officials
in question are likely unaware of this Article.
As one can see, at times official bodies themselves do not acknowledge
or adhere to the laws; therefore, it is quite difficult for journalists
to refer to any particular normative acts. One must note that this practice
has already become traditional within the country. Some sources maintain
that decisions regarding accreditation of foreign journalists are made
by the special services. An Uzbek journalist employed by a Russian media
outlet says that “those persons who continue to work for foreign media
but are not officially accredited may be accused of espionage, or of engaging
in subversive activities, as provided for by the Criminal Code of
Uzbekistan”. This circumstance complicates a reporter’s work: it is as if
he is engaging in his professional activity illegally. Any journalist arriving
at any event without official accreditation documents is sure to get
into trouble with the authorities.
According to a poll conducted among media representatives by the Palitra
Centre, a significant number of journalists in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
would like to be independent; however, in Kyrgyzstan, over twothirds
of the people polled wish to be employed as full-time staff members,
linking that to their material well-being (see Table 2).
Central Asian journalists’ answers to the question
“In what capacity would you like to work in the media?”
(in per cent) 19
Looking at Table 3, one can see a difference in the opinions of Central
Asian journalists with respect to the kind of media they wish to be
employed by. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, about one-fifth of
journalists polled wish to work for the national media, while in Kazakhstan,
this number is over one-third. Experts believe that this is due to
the fact that in Kazakhstan, domestic media staff have the opportunity to
receive higher salaries than their counterparts in the neighboring
republics.
Central Asian journalists’ answers to the question
“What kind of media would you like to represent?”
(in per cent) 20
In answering the question, “Why would you like to work for a foreign
media outlet?”, Uzbek journalists polled provided the following
responses:
• to receive a high (compared to the local level) salary – 62 per cent;
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
Answers Kazakhstan Kyrgystan Uzbekistan
As a full-time staff member of an editorial office 40 67 45
On a contractual basis, as a freelance author 19 10 20
As an independent journalist 41 23 35
19 Sociological data provided by the Palitra Centre; the poll was conducted in December 2001 – January
2002 in three Central Asian republics; 143 people polled.
20 See Footnote 19.
Answers Kazakhstan Kyrgystan Uzbekistan
I would like to represent a domestic media outlet 36 22 19
I would like to represent a foreign media outlet
in my country 64 78 81
290
• to have an opportunity to travel abroad – 27 per cent;
• to obtain additional professional skills and learn new media technologies
– 4 per cent;
• to not be subjected to censorship – 3 per cent;
• to be protected by a foreign state – 2 per cent;
• to have the prestigious status of a foreign correspondent – 2 per cent.
In other words, over two-thirds of the respondents see an improvement
in their well-being when working for a foreign media outlet. Also important
is the opportunity to travel abroad, which is a strong stimulus for
Uzbek journalists. It goes without saying that Western media reject censorship;
it is also known for using modern technologies for receiving and
processing information; therefore, a small number of those polled attributed
their interest in working for foreign media to that, while others considered
it natural and ordinary. Certainly, there is a large number of Uzbek
journalists who would have liked to represent their domestic media
abroad. Currently, this is practised only by the Zhakhon information
agency, which is a structural division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
those employees of the agency who are working abroad are also considered
diplomats, and carry diplomatic papers in addition to their journalistic
accreditations. Other media outlets find this practice difficult due to
the high costs of maintaining an office abroad. It is much more effective
to receive information from foreign sources, and provide one’s own interpretation
of it to the domestic audience as if it was original. Newspapers
and television stations commonly use information obtained from the
Internet in this fashion.
Protection of state secrets constitutes another issue. Throughout the
world, access to information containing state secrets is conventionally limited
to individuals cleared by the relevant institutions (special services, law
enforcement agencies, etc.); meanwhile, Article 6 of the Uzbek Law on
Media establishes the inadmissibility of using media for “disclosing state
or otherwise legally protected secrets”. One would think that this provision
would only apply to the people with access to such information. However,
in practice, things may be different; i.e., a journalist may write an
Alisher Taksanov
291
article containing elements of a state secret without having any access to
secret information. This journalist may be held legally liable in accordance
with Article 162 of the Criminal Code, on “Disclosure of State Secrets”.
This Article states that “disclosure or transfer of information containing
state secrets… by a person who had received such information… through
his/her professional activities, is punishable by incarceration for three to
five years (in the absence of treason), or for five to eight years (under
grave circumstances).” The prosecution may easily apply the “professional
activities” clause to journalism. Furthermore, Article 10 of the Law on
Protection of State Secrets stipulates that “protection of state secrets is a
responsibility… of citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan”; i.e., ordinary
citizens, perhaps unaware of the fact that something they have written contains
state secrets, may also be held liable. Thus, a journalist once published
an article in the Pravda Vostoka newspaper, detailing his opinion
on the development of the country’s export potential, whereupon the
Deputy Minister of External Economic Relations (as well as a special service
agent) demanded an explanation of where the journalist had obtained
the information, and why he had disclosed state secrets. “It is paradoxical
that my thoughts happened to be close to classified materials, although I
had no access to any secrets, nor did I possess any official data on the economic
area in question; all of what I wrote was based on my own conclusions”,
the journalist stated in a private conversation.
In the current conditions, it is quite difficult to determine whether or
not any particular information is classified as a state secret. It would seem
that this ambiguity should be cleared up by Article 5 of the Law on State
Secrets, which stipulates that “classifying and de-classifying information
as secret is conducted in accordance with this Law, the Procedural Statute
for Definition and Establishment of the Degree of Secrecy, and the List
of Information Subject to Classification as Secret, as approved by the
Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan”. In the opinion of
Karim Bakhriev, a journalist and legal expert for Internews-Uzbekistan,
“since the aforementioned documents have not been made public in
Uzbekistan, no one has been (or can be) held liable for disclosing state
secrets. In order for a state to function normally, these documents must
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
292
be published, and made accessible to all citizens, who, in turn, must
adhere to them and be held liable in the event of a violation. That would
spare the government the preliminary examination of all media texts,
which constitutes censorship, and is therefore illegal.” Bakhriev adds that
“the institutions protecting state secrets may feel free to exercise their
supervisory functions (including legal ramifications against those found
guilty) after the relevant documents have been published, announced, or
shown to the media.”21
Since journalists do not know what constitutes a state secret, it is difficult
for them to receive information; furthermore, at times they are
afraid to cover particular subjects, fearing liability for unwittingly disclosing
secrets. On the other hand, the problem may also be reversed.
“Quite often, an official unwilling to produce particular information to a
journalist uses national security as a reason for so doing, referring to an
arbitrarily self-placed ‘Secret’ or ‘For Internal Use Only’ stamp”, R.
Gafurov writes. Naturally, an official, wishing to avoid any trouble with
the higher authorities, refuses to meet with journalists, let alone produce
any information. The principle of “better safe than sorry” is at work here;
one must be responsible for any words uttered, while there is no direct
responsibility for any events that might have taken place.
It would be appropriate to use foreign experience as an example. Article
2 Paragraph 3 of the Law on Media of the Republic of Armenia states
that “liability for disclosure, through media, of any state or otherwise
legally protected secrets rests with the proprietor of such information,
who is responsible for protecting it in accordance with his/her professional
duties”22. As Karim Bakhriev points out, “a journalist may not be
held liable if any particular secret has reached him through a conversation
in a chaikhan (café – transl.) or at a local market. Those individuals
entrusted by the state with keeping secrets safe are to be held liable.”
Uzbek censorship does exist, unofficially, and yet legitimately, because
state secrets exist. However, journalists’ opinions on censorship differ:
while media representatives in Kazakhstan are less convinced that cen-
Alisher Taksanov
21 www.ferghana.org/analitics/013.html
22 Laws on Mass Media of Kazakhstan and Foreign Countries. Almaty, Daniker, 2001, p. 162.
293
sorship exists to protect state secrets, over a half of their Uzbek counterparts
believe that it is so. Meanwhile, the majority of journalists are convinced
that censorship allows for concealment of many social problems,
such as repression, low level of living, corruption, lobbying of clan
groups’ interests, etc. (see Table 5).
“What is censorship for?”
Opinions of journalists of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
(in per cent) 23
Likewise, the majority of those polled claim that the authorities are
afraid of dissent. Karim Bakhriev writes: “censorship is employed by the
government that is afraid of its own people and unsure of itself; therefore,
it considers it necessary to control not only the tangible elements,
such as the land, water, property, cotton, oil, etc., but also the intangible,
such as people’s thoughts. Censorship is a manipulation tool.”24 The journalists’
own lack of legal awareness allows them to believe that censorship
helps to avoid trouble with the authorities and responsibility for their
own words. “However, among censors, there are no legal experts that can
foresee potential legal conflicts”, Nadira Bairamova, a reporter, points
out. “It is actually quite difficult to determine the censors’ background.
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
23 Data provided by the Palitra Centre; the poll was conducted in December 2001-January 2002; 102 people
polled.
24 “Censorship Is Useless, Harmful, and Degrading. A speech in defense of Article 67 of the Uzbek Constitution.”
© All manuscript rights reserved, Tashkent, 2001, p. 24.
Answers Kazakhstan Uzbekistan
To protect state secrets 14 55
To conceal the true state of affairs from the people 92 76
To avoid dissent and “intellectual ferment” 76 68
To prohibit dissemination of anti-government
and anti-social material 11 39
To avoid being responsible to the authorities for writing an article 29 44
294
One is left with an impression that they are people of little education,
zealously trying to execute a governmental order.”
A journalistic investigation is an effective means of collecting and
analysing information of public significance on any event. However, officials
and authorities often withhold the existence of this useful tool. In
Western media, journalistic investigations have helped law enforcement
agencies to solve crimes and detain criminals; they have also helped parliaments
to exercise better control over the government and its institutions,
and to solve social problems. Even specialised associations exist
in this area: for example, in Denmark, there is an Association of Journalistic
Investigations, which conducts conferences with media representatives
sharing their investigative experiences and new technologies
available in that area.
In Uzbekistan, this activity is established in the legislation; for
instance, Article 9 of the Law on Media states that “an editorial staff member
has the right to study, by means of a journalistic investigation of a
specific event, any circumstas which became known to him/her through
contacts with any other sources, or which he/she witnessed…” The same
Article establishes a journalist’s right to “…use audio/video technology
while collecting facts and gatheringinterviews”, which logically contradicts
Article 6 of the Law on Protection of the Professional Activity of
Journalists, which, in turn, states that “a journalist may not use any
audio/video recording devices without prior permission of the source of
information”. Thus, if a journalist conducts an investigation of corruption,
he/she acts illegally if using concealed recording devices. You may
agree that it would ridiculous for a media representative to ask a corrupt
official’s permission to use an audio or video device to record an instance
of the official in question receiving a bribe.
Meanwhile, in accordance with Article 22 of the Armenian Media Law,
“dissemination of reports and/or materials prepared with concealed
audio/video recording devices is permitted if it does not violate the constitutionally
protected human rights and liberties, necessary for protecting
public interests, or has been required by a court decision”. Thus, in
that case, a journalistic investigation assisted in the struggle against neg-
Alisher Taksanov
295
ative social aspects, and provides for legal protection of the journalist.
Meanwhile, Article 9 of the Uzbek Law on Media contains another
paradox: “a journalistic investigation shall not influence the course of a
legal investigation or a judicial process”. At the same time, Article 2 of
the Law on Courts states that “the judges shall be independent, and
answerable only to the law. Any interference with the justice-administering
activities is inadmissible, and legally punishable.” If the legal system
is fully independent, then how can a journalistic investigation influence
the course of an investigation or a judicial process? Especially if one considers
the fact that Article 6 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office states
that “any interference… by media outlets with the Prosecutors’ Office…
is prohibited”. So, if a journalist writes an article assessing an investigation,
he or she exhibits a de facto violation of the Criminal Code. However,
in other countries, the media serve as one of the means of obtaining
the truth. For example, in Russia, journalists often write of their perished
colleagues, such as Dmitri Kholodov (the Komsomolskaya Pravda)
or Vladislav Listiev (ORT), even though both of these cases have been
under investigation for many years. None of the legal or law enforcement
agencies have accused the Russian media of interfering with their activities
or exerting pressure.
Article 6 of the Uzbek Law on Media prohibits one to publish the materials
of a preliminary investigation without prior written permission from
the prosecutor, investigator, or examiner. As Ruslan Minulin points out,
“if the journalists had been waiting for the results of the official investigation
into the events with the nuclear submarine ‘Kursk’, the world
would have never known of this August 2000 tragedy. The media collected
a multitude of expert opinions, which aided the investigation with
their suggestions and hypotheses. Did they require a prosecutor’s permission
for so doing? Uzbek legislation states, in Article 3 of the Media
Law, that ‘each person has the right to use media to openly express his/her
opinions and convictions.’Why should a journalist be unable to simply
express his/her opinion, without turning to the investigating authorities
for information? Did the local press publish the results of the trial over
the Koraev family, members of which had killed six people in Bukhara,
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
296
selling their organs for transplants abroad, and supplying the meat to a
local restaurant? No, but the foreign media did!”
Journalists often claim that their investigations are viewed critically by
law enforcement agencies, as if the media are trying to undermine them.
According to the polls conducted in 1998, 54 out of 380 journalists (14
per cent) confirmed that administrative and law enforcement agencies
demanded from them the disclosure of the information received while
conducting professional activities. “There exists a notion of a journalistic
secret”, Sveltana Odintsova, an independent journalists, says. “It is
confidential information, or facts and events voluntarily reported by the
citizens or other sources. Article 7 of the Law on Media prohibits a journalist
from ‘disclosing information classified as a journalistic secret,
without permission of the source of information; it is likewise prohibited
to use such information… in the interests of third parties,’ such as investigators.
However, a law enforcement agent may hold a journalist criminally
liable for refusing to disclose a source of such information, referring
to Article 240 of the Criminal Code: ‘Evasion of Responsibility by
the Participants in a Criminal Trial.’A journalist may be viewed as such
a participant, in his capacity as a reporter. Thus, a mass media representative
may find him/herself in a rather precarious situation.”
Article 6 of the Uzbek Law on Media stipulates that only a court has
the right to demand from a journalist disclosure of the source of information,
while the same law in Belarus grants this right to any person conducting
an investigation (Article 34). One may claim that Uzbek journalists
are in a more privileged position in this regard than their counterparts
in Belarus. However, that is only so from a legal standpoint, while
in actuality, any investigator is able to exert psychological pressure and
receive necessary information from an editorial office.
Journalistic practice knows of other “nuances” that complicate media
activity to one degree or another. For example, there is the issue of economic
survival. Currently, the costs for printing, newsprint, and distribution
are rather high, and the newspapers’ retail prices are unable to cover
all of them. Certain publications enjoy state support by being included in
the budgets of local administrations (e.g. Tashkentskaya Pravda, and
Alisher Taksanov
297
Evening Tashkent), the government (Narodnoe slovo, Pravda Vostoka), or
Ministries and official departments (Business Partner of Uzbekistan, Private
Property). Other media outlets that do not have state institutions as
their founders must rely exclusively on the sponsorship by private organizations
and on advertising. It is advertising that often serves as the only
source of financial support for such publications. “Without advertising,
our newspaper would have been on the brink of bankruptcy, even though
the current volume of advertising is not sufficient”, claims a staff member
from the popular economic Business Herald of the East newspaper.
Meanwhile, the Law on Advertising stipulates, in Article 18, that “in
print media that do not specialise in advertisements and announcements,
advertising must not exceed 40 per cent of the volume of one issue; the
rest must be provided as a supplement, free of charge.” In other words,
editorial offices may count only on this advertising volume, which
includes not only modular advertisements, but also public relations materials
that may appear in text form. On the other hand, this provision is a
slight improvement from that of the Kyrgyz Republic, which stipulates,
in Article 12 of the relevant law, that the advertising volume shall not
exceed 20 per cent in one issue.25
Advertising depends not only on a media outlet’s prestige, but also on
its audience coverage, which, in turn, depends on subscription and distribution
systems, as well as on circulation. According to Vadim Sirotin,
editor of Business Herald of the East, “if your circulation is less than
10,000 copies, advertisers are not interested, since it is simply economically
unprofitable”. Meanwhile, not all media outlets display their circulation,
since it has to do with the ability to attract advertisers. The current
circulation of nationwide political publications does not appear to
exceed 6,000 copies, while the entertainment Darakchi newspaper and
the Russian Trud and Argumenty i fakty have volumes of 50,000 copies
and more. In this regard, editorial offices act in violation of Article 21 of
the Law on Media, which stipulates that a media outlet must publicly produce
certain data, including information on circulation.
IN DEFENCE OF THE FUTURE
V
25 A Journalist’s Aide. Law of the Kyrgyz Republic Regulating Media Activity. Soros Foundation-Kyrgyzstan,
Bishkek, 2001, p. 112
298
In the event that a newspaper misleads an advertiser by claiming that
its circulation is higher than it actually is, it may be held liable for providing
false information. In this regard, tax authorities may be involved,
on the grounds that the newspaper receives revenues from unaccounted
production. Thus, newspapers find themselves as if between Scylla and
Charybdis.
Another “nuance” is the newspapers’ obligation to publish material
received from the government. Article 22 of the Law on Media states that
media outlets established by state institutions must publish official
releases of those institutions; that is entirely understandable. Special
announcements regarding a state of emergency, or urgent public messages
by relevant state officials are published by all media outlets. However,
how can one view as “special” and “urgent” the censoring institutions’
demand to publish, in non-state-owned media, information regarding four
newly proclaimed Heroes of Uzbekistan (who had become such on the
eve of Independence Day in 1999)? What about the official requirement
to publish an article on Abdulla Aripov, a poet, on the occasion of a
national celebration in his honour? The authorities once “cut” an entire
printed issue of Tax and Customs News, for the reason that the editorial
board had forgotten to cover Islam Karimov’s visit to NATO on the front
page… Situations such as this one fall under a legal stipulation that “any
other kind of information or announcement shall be published on a contractual
basis”, that is, for a fee. However, there has never been a precedent
when the censoring authorities (or any other official institution) paid
for the publication of such “compulsory” announcements.
Thus, contemporary media practice in Uzbekistan demonstrates that the
authorities continue to view journalism not as a mechanism for informing
the population of any particular events, but rather as a mouthpiece of ideological
indoctrination. In this regard, the authorities do not consider it
shameful to introduce illegal forms of management and control, such as
censorship, in circumvention of the country’s fundamental law.
Äðóãèå ñòàòüè â ëèòåðàòóðíîì äíåâíèêå:
|
